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The Supreme Court’s last 30 years of Federal Indian Law: Looking 
for Equilibrium or Supremacy? 
Alex Tallchief Skibine* 
 
Since 1831, Indian tribes have been viewed as Domestic Dependent Nations located 
within the geographical boundaries of the United States.1  Although Chief Justice John Marshall 
acknowledged that Indian nations had a certain amount of sovereignty,2  the exact extent of such 
sovereignty as well as the place of tribes within the federal system, has remained ill-defined.  This 
Article examines what has been the role of the Supreme Court in integrating Indian nations as 
the third Sovereign within our federalist system.3   Although I have written on similar topics in 
the past,4 this Article looks at this issue by surveying and examining the Court’s Indian law record 
in the last 30 years.  
The Court initially deferred questions concerning the status of tribes within the political 
system of the United States to Congress,5 whose policy towards Tribes changed with the times.6  
Initially, Indian nations were viewed as political entities existing outside of our political system 
and most of the relations between the United States and the tribes were governed through 
treaties.7  Things started changing after 1871, the year a law was enacted prohibiting any more 
treaties with Indian nations.8  Soon after, the United States embarked on a policy aimed at 
                                                          
* S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.  I would like to thank 
George Skibine for his editorial review of this Article and Professor Kirsten Carlson for providing critical 
comments and suggestions on a previous draft of this Article. 
1 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. 1 (1831). Although this Article will use the terms “Indian nations” 
and “Indian tribes” interchangeably, the United States Constitution refers only to Indian “tribes.”  The use 
of the term “tribes” in the Constitution played a key role in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia  where the Court 
held that Indian tribes were neither States of the Union or foreign nations for the purpose of invoking the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. 
2  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).    
3 Describing Indian nations as “the third sovereign” may have originated initially with Justice O’Connor.  
See Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 Tulsa L.J. 1 
(1997).  
4  See Alex T. Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within “Our Federalism”: Beyond the 
Dependency Paradigm, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 667 (2006), and Alex T. Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian 
Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 47 (2004). 
5 See for instance United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 
(1903). 
6 See Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2012 Ed., pp. 23-108.  
7 See Vine Deloria Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 
963 (1996).   
8 Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 466 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 71 (2000) (stating “No Indian 
nation of tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an 
independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”)  
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assimilating individual Indians into the mainstream of American society.9  There was no idea at 
that time to integrate Indian nations into our political system as sovereign governments.  The 
expectations were that Indian tribes, as political entities would soon disappear.10   The current 
policy, however, is to promote tribal self-determination and recognize tribes as self-governing 
entities with enough sovereignty to have a government-to-government relationship with the 
United States.11    
The Supreme Court’s record of decided cases in the last thirty years indicates that the 
Court has had difficulties upholding the federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty and 
encouraging tribal self-government.  For instance, in an influential article, David Getches 
documented that during the first 15 terms of the Rehnquist Court, Indian tribal interests only 
won about 23% of Federal Indian law cases at the Supreme Court from 1986 until 2001.12   As the 
title of his article indicated, Getches believed that the dismal tribal record was influenced by the 
Court’s agenda to promote states’ rights, a color-blind agenda, and mainstream values. Getches’ 
findings were later supplemented by Professor Matthew Fletcher who analyzed  the Cert process 
at the Supreme Court and found that while very few tribal petitions were granted, a 
disproportionately large number of petitions filed by non-tribal interests aimed at overturning 
decisions favorable to these tribal interests were granted.13  In a more recent article, Professor 
Bethany Berger updated the numbers found by Getches by looking at cases decided between 
1990 and 2016.14   While confirming that the percentage of tribal wins from 1990 until 2015 had 
not improved since Getches’s 2001 article, she saw an improvement in the 2015-16 term that 
perhaps indicated that tribal interests could find some light at the end of this anti-tribal tunnel.   
In this article, I start with an in-depth examination of the last 30 years of Indian law 
decisions.15  Starting where Professor Berger left off, after first categorizing the cases between 
victories and losses during this time, Part II divides the cases into four categories: Federal 
common law, statutory interpretation, constitutional law, and procedural law.  The cases are 
then further divided into four general areas within the field of Federal Indian law: 1.  
                                                          
9 See Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2012 Edition) at pp. 71-79.  
10 See Kathryn E Fort, The Vanishing Indian Returns: Tribes, Popular Originalism, and the Supreme Court, 
57 St. Louis U. L. J. 297 (2013).  
11 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121, 135-136 
(2006). 
12 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice 
and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 280-281 (2001). 
13 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian 
Tribes, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 933 (2009). 
14 Bethany Berger Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court, Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, 
Bryant, Dollar General, and Beyond, (forthcoming in the University of Illinois Law Review.) (Hereinafter 
Hope for Indian Tribes) 
15 My survey starts with the 1987-1988 term and ends with the 2016-2017 term.  For another survey, see 
Lawrence R. Baca, 40 Years of U.S. Supreme Court Indian Law Cases, 62 –APR Fed. Law 18 (2015)(listing all 
the cases from 1976 until 2014, classifying them as tribal victories or not, and commenting on the Justices 
who wrote some of the cases).   
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Political/sovereign rights, 2. Economic Rights (treaty/property rights), 3. Rights derived from the 
Indian trust doctrine, and 4. Cultural/Religious rights.  Part II ends by assessing the trends in the 
evolution of the cases and concludes by formulating general principles that can be derived from 
the tribal win/loss record in these different classifications.  
In Part III, I focus on the interaction between the Court and Congress concerning the 
incorporation of tribes as third sovereigns within the federalist system.  This Part first evaluates 
Congress’s response to Supreme Court cases. It then looks at the Court’s response to 
congressional legislation.  In a noted article, Professors Frickey and Eskridge put forth the thesis 
that in deciding cases, the Court is evaluating what Congress and the Executive branch think 
about the broader issues involved in such cases and responds accordingly, in effect trying to reach 
a legal “equilibrium” among the three branches of government. As stated by the authors:  
Positive political theory claims that lawmaking institutions are rational, self-interested, 
interdependent, and affected by the sequence of institutional interaction. When viewed 
through this lens, law is... an equilibrium, a state of balance among competing forces or 
institutions. Congress, the executive, and the courts engage in purposive behavior. Each 
branch seeks to promote its vision of the public interest, but only as that vision can be 
achieved within a complex, interactive setting in which each organ of government is both 
cooperating with and competing with the other organs. To achieve its goals, each branch 
also acts strategically, calibrating its actions in anticipation of how other institutions 
would respond.16 
Yet when it comes to Federal Indian Law, one has to wonder if the Supreme Court does 
not have another agenda on the table.  One that does not try to reach an equilibrium about 
incorporating tribes as the third sovereign within our federalism but instead aims to impose the 
Court’s own terms on how Indian tribes should be integrated into our Federalist system.17   For 
instance, in two other articles, Professor Frickey noted that one of the reason Tribal sovereignty 
was under attack at the Court was that the Court was abandoning the exceptionalism of John 
Marshall’s foundational Indian law cases,18 and was instead adopting a new “federal common 
law” for what he called, “our age of colonialism.”19  
In the 1930’s Congress made the decision to integrate tribes into our political system as 
quasi-sovereign entities.20  However, most tribes were isolated geographically and lacked the 
financial resources to have much of an impact on non-Indians or outside Indian Country.  In the 
last thirty years, things have changed.  Tribes are now more meaningful actors, economically and 
politically.  This could explain the Court’s new aggressiveness in taking on Indian cases and, some 
may argue, judicial activism in modifying foundational principles established when tribes were 
                                                          
16 See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 28-29 (1994).  
17 …………………………………………. 
18 Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 433 (2005)  
19 Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal 
Authority over Non-Members, 109 Yale L.J. 1 (1999).  
20 See Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2012 Edition, at pp. 79-84.  
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not much of a factor in the economic and political life of the United States.21  As once noted by 
Professor Judith Resnick, when issues become important enough to the government, it will 
remind “the dominated group of its dependence upon the larger collective and works to bring 
the smaller group into compliance with federal norms.”22  Federal Courts will then impose federal 
rules of decisions on either state or tribal courts.23  Perhaps this is the reason why Philip Frickey 
was right when he observed that the Court was in the process of “flattening” federal Indian law 
into the broader American public law by importing general constitutional and sub-constitutional 
value into the field.“24  
 Some scholars have argued that Congress has given up its leading role in formulating 
federal Indian policy.25  Others have noted that Congress is in fact much more active in enacting 
laws affecting or concerning Indian nations than previously thought. 26  Part III ends with 
evaluating the role of the Court’s use of Federal Common law.  I argue here that perhaps the 
Court is not trying to reach an equilibrium with Congress but is looking for a different kind of 
equilibrium.  In other words, the Court is not attempting to achieve a balance between Congress 
and itself, but is aiming to establish what the Court perceives should be the proper equilibrium 
between tribal interests on one hand and the non-Indian/state interests on the other.  
PART II: DISSECTING THE RECORD:  WHAT THE NUMBERS TELL US:  
As reflected in Appendix A, the survey takes into account 66 cases.27  The survey shows that 
of these 66 cases, tribal interests lost 47.5 cases and won 18.5.28  This represent a tribal win ratio 
                                                          
21 On foundational principles of federal Indian law and how the Court is changing them, see David H. 
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 
Cal L. Rev. 1573 (1996).   
22 Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671, 756 
(1989). 
23 Id., at 754 (Stating that federal courts have allowed Tribes unrestricted authority on certain intra tribal 
issues such as tribal membership dispute because these “are not decisions of national importance.” Id., 
at 754.     
24 Philip P. Frickey, Our Age of Colonialism, supra at note 18, at pp.73-77. 
25 See Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra at note 11.  
26 See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. Of Col. L. Rev. 77 (2015).  
27 Not included in the total number is South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).  The case involved an Indian tribe and a number of environmental 
organizations bringing a case against a Florida water management district for violation of the Clean Water 
Act.  The case was remanded for more factual findings.  I do not regard this case as a Federal Indian Law 
case.  It is an environmental law case where one of the plaintiffs happened to be an Indian tribe.  I have 
also not included Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996).  The case involved a 
challenge to the Interior Secretary’s decision to take land in trust for a Tribe. Over a strong dissent by 
Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas, the Court granted cert, vacated the decision below, and order the 
case remanded to the Secretary (GVR) so that a new decision could made using newly issued regulations  
28 The half point comes from the fact that in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990), the 
Tribe won half the case (Tribal jurisdiction over non-member property in the “closed” part of the 
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of only 28% . However, that percentage is still higher than the numbers found by David Getches 
in his 2001 study (23%) summarizing the first 17 years of the Rehnquist Court,29 and just a bit 
higher than that found by Professor Berger in her more recent study.30   
A. THE RECORD BASED ON THE TYPE OF LAW USED TO DECIDE THE CASES. 
This part divides the cases into four categories: Federal common law, statutory/treaty 
interpretation, constitutional law, and procedural law.31  The cases are divided into those four 
categories because when it comes to Federal Indian law, all the relevant cases can be fitted into 
these categories.  In spite of strong arguments from various scholars that international law should 
provide the rules of decisions in many Indian law cases, the Court has unfortunately not yet 
followed that recommendation.32  Whether a case is decided using federal common law or 
constitutional law is normally easy to tell although that issue was the subject of at least one 
Supreme Court decision in Federal Indian law.33 
1. Federal Common law decisions: 28.5 cases. 
The survey indicates that there was a total of 28.5 cases decided on Federal common law 
grounds. The half point is the result of considering California v. Cabazon Band as half a statutory 
interpretation case and half a federal common law case.34 Of these federal common law cases, 
tribal interests won 9 and lost 19.5 cases. This represent a tribal win ratio of 31.5%.  
 The tribal percentage of wins may look better than it might have been because three of 
the tribal wins were against the Oklahoma Tax Commission and were perhaps the result of an 
overly aggressive anti–tribal agenda on behalf of that Commission.35  Also, after much debate, I 
did include Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 36  in this survey as a tribal win although, 
perhaps, the case is better described as not a loss rather than an outright win.  In that case, the 
                                                          
reservation), but lost the other half of the case (no tribal jurisdiction over non-member property in the 
“open” section.)   
29 See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra at note 12. 
30 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra at note 14.  Professor Berger’s percentage of tribal wins from 
1990 until 2016 is 27.3%.  The minor difference can be explained by the slightly different scope of the 
years covered in the two surveys, 1990-2016 for hers instead of 1987-2017 for mine.  The difference in 
years considered resulted in a difference in the number of cases included: 53 in her study, 66 for mine.     
31 This last category is in effect is a residual one containing all cases not fitting in the first three categories.   
32 See Robert A. Williams Jr.,  Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal 
History of Racism in America (2005), Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 
31 (1996).  
33 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
34 480 U.S. 202 (1987).    
35 See Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Sac and Fox nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), Oklahoma Tax Commission, v. Chickasaw Nation, 
515 U.S. 450  (1995). It is noteworthy that these are the only three cases Indian nations won fighting the 
states’ attempts to tax activities in Indian Country using the Indian preemption doctrine after the Court 
issued its 1989 decision in Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).   
36 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016). 
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Supreme Court split 4-4 thereby affirming the decision below that was in favor of tribal civil 
jurisdiction over a non-member.  Experts seem to agree, however, that if Justice Scalia had still 
been alive, his previous record and questioning during the oral argument indicate that, in all 
likelihood, he would have voted against the tribal interests.37     
 Of the other wins, two upheld tribal sovereign immunity,38 one allowed a tribe to sue the 
United States for breach of trust in the management of trust assets,39 and half of Brendale v. 
Confederated Tribes40 allowed tribal jurisdiction over non-members in the “closed” parts of the 
reservation. Two of the more meaningful wins came early on.  In California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, the tribe was allowed to conduct certain gaming activities free of state 
regulation, 41  and in Iowa Mutual v. Laplante, 42  the Court reaffirmed and extended the 
requirement that non-members being sued in tribal court should first have to exhaust their tribal 
court remedies before challenging tribal jurisdiction in federal court.       
 The tribal loss category can be divided into four subcategories: 1. Tribal Jurisdiction over 
non-members, 2. State taxation inside Indian reservations, 3. Cases interpreting the trust 
doctrine, and 4. Cases involving both tribal and state sovereign immunity.  
Tribal interests lost 6.5 cases out of 7.5 cases involving tribal jurisdiction over non-
members.43 Tribal interests also lost six cases involving the states’ attempts to tax activities on 
Indian land or Indian reservations.44  Judicial Interpretation of the Trust doctrine also proved 
detrimental to tribes as tribal interests lost 4 cases. Two cases involved the Navajo Nation 
attempts to sue the United States for breach of trust.45  Another one involved a tribal attempt to 
                                                          
37 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra at note14.   
38 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 124 U.S. 2024 (2014) and Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing 
technologies, 523 U.S. 751 (1998).  
39 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).   
40 492 U.S. 408 (1990).  
41 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
42 480 U.S. 9 (1987).  
43 The six cases are:  Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), and Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 
(2008). The tribes also lost half of Brendale v. Confederated tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).  
44  Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Department of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 
679 (1994), Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696 (1998), Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze 
Construction, 526 U.S. 32 (1999), City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), and Wagnon 
v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).   
45  United States v. Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). and United States v. Navajo Nation II, 556 U.S. 
287 (2009)(both cases finding that no statutes allowed the Navajo Nation the right to sue the United states 
for breach of trust). While both cases could be classified as involving statutory construction in that the 
issue was whether statutes could fairly be interpreted as allowing a breach of trust action against the 
United States for mismanagement of trust assets, I view them as being more about applying the Indian 
trust doctrine to the interpretation of statutes than just cases about statutory interpretation.      
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apply the trust doctrine to the Freedom of Information Act.46  Perhaps the most important one, 
in a jurisprudential sense, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,47 held that the trust doctrine 
could not allow the Tribe access to documents in possession of the United States that was both 
the trustee for the plaintiff Tribe but also the defendant in the case.  The importance of the case 
stems from language throughout the Opinion indicating that, absent specific statutory language, 
the general law of trust could not be imported to define the duties of the United States as trustee 
for the tribes because its role as trustee was so different than that of a regular trustee.   
Tribal interests also lost three cases dealing with sovereign immunity. Two cases involved 
tribal sovereign Immunity,48 and one the sovereign immunity of the states.49   
2. Statutory Interpretation cases: 21.5 cases. 
Among the 66 cases, 21.5 involved statutory/treaty interpretation.  Among those, the 
tribal interests lost 15 and won 6.5 cases or 30.2% of all the cases in this category. It is 
interesting to note that beside Cabazon (counting for half a case),50 all other six tribal wins 
involved interpretations of Indian specific legislation. Two involved interpretation of the Indian 
Self Determination Act.51 Two more involved treaty and quasi treaty interpretations.52 The oldest 
case decided in this category involved interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act,53 and the 
last decided case, Nebraska v. Parker, involved federal legislation which was alleged to have 
disestablished an Indian reservation.54  
Among the tribal losses, ten cases involved Indian specific legislation, and five involved 
general type of legislation. The Indian specific legislation included an interpretation of the Indian 
                                                          
46 Department of Interior v. Klamath River Water Users, 530 U.S. 495 (2000)(Trust doctrine does not create 
a tribal exception to FOIA. 
47 564 U.S. 162 (2011).  
48 C.L. Enterprise v. Citizens Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 422 (2001)( Holding that the Tribe 
had waived its immunity) and Lewis v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017)(Refusing to extend the sovereign 
immunity of the Tribe to tribal employees committing torts off the reservation while on tribal assignment.)   
49 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)(Refusing to extend the Ex parte Young Doctrine to allow 
the tribe to sue the State.)  
50 480 U.S. 202 (1987)(interpreting P.L. 280 as not allowing state civil regulatory jurisdiction over Indian 
gaming).  
51 Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012), Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 
(2005). Interestingly, in the seven years separating these two cases, tribal interests did not win once at 
the Supreme Court.  
52 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), and Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 
262 (2001). I called this last one a quasi-treaty case because the Court had to interpret an 1891 Act that 
ratified two previous tribal agreements made with the Coeur D’Alene Tribe. The Court held that Congress 
intended to reserve all submerged land under lakes and rivers when it legislatively ratified these two 
previous tribal agreements.   
53 Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).  
54 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).  
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Child Welfare Act,55  a tax provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,56 an interpretation of 
the Indian Reorganization Act,57 and  an interpretation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (ANCSA).58 In addition, two cases interpreted the General Allotment Act and the Burke Act, 
to allow state taxation of Indian owned fee patented lands. 59  Two other cases interpreted Acts 
opening up reservations for non-Indian settlers as terminating reservation status.60   Another 
case interpreted a Kansas act as conferring criminal jurisdiction on the State.61  Finally, in Hawaii 
v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs,62 the Court held that when Congress enacted the Native Hawaiian 
Apology Resolution, it did not intend to strip the State of Hawaii of its sovereign power to alienate  
lands which had previously been ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii the United States and then 
transferred to the State.    
Among the five losses involving general and not Indian specific legislation, one case dealt 
with interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Quiet Title Act.63  Another one 
held that Indian tribes were not “persons” for the purposes of being allowed to sue under Section 
1983.64  One case held that claims brought under the Price-Anderson Act required federal court 
jurisdiction so that tribal exhaustion of remedies could not be mandated.65 Another one held that 
the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 conveyed everything to the non-Indian surface patentees 
except the coal which had been reserved to the United States. Therefore, it was these patentees 
and not the Tribe who owned the coal bed methane gas under the land.66  Finally one case dealt 
with the rights of Alaska Natives under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 
(ANILCA).67 
3. Constitutional Law: 11 cases.   
                                                          
55 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
56 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001).  
57 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009)(holding that only tribes under federal jurisdiction as of 1934 
could benefit from section 5 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. 465,  allowing the Secretary of Interior to take land into 
trust for the benefit of Indians.  
58 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)(Holding that sections of the law reserving lands 
for Indians in fee simple did not create “Indian Country” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151).  
59 County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) Cass County v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 
103 (1998) (Holding that when Congress makes Indian or tribal land freely alienable, it clearly signifies an 
intent to allow state taxation of such lands.)  
60 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).  
61 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993).  
62 556 U.S. 163 (2009) 
63 Mach-E-B-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 219 (2012) 
64 Inyo County v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003).  
65 El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999).  
66 Amoco Production v. Southern Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).  
67 Amoco Production v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).  
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Cases decided on constitutional grounds were even more detrimental to tribal interests 
than the two previously discussed areas.  There was a total of 11 cases.  The tribes only won two 
cases and lost nine. This amounts only to an 18.1% rate of success.   
The major tribal win, and some may say, the most significant win of all during this period, 
was United States v. Lara.68  The Court in Lara held that decisions like Duro v. Reina where the 
Court held that Tribes had been implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-members, 
were decisions based on Federal Common law and not constitutional law.  As such, these 
decisions could be reversed or modified by Congress.69    
The other tribal win was United States v. Bryant,70 holding that convictions obtained in 
tribal courts could be counted for the purpose of enhancing sentences in federal courts even if 
the defendants in tribal courts did not benefit from the assistance of counsel.  Although the case 
is a win as far as recognizing the legitimacy of tribal courts within the federal system, some may 
argue that it is a loss for those who think the assistance of counsel is crucial to ensure a fair 
conviction.71   
Among the nine losses, three cases involved Indian/tribal interests but were not, strictly 
speaking, Indian cases.  Matal v. Tam is a non-Indian case with ramifications for cases challenging 
the use of Indian mascots.72  Employment Division v. Smith involved the use of Peyote as a 
sacrament in Native American religious practices but the constitutional principle devised by the 
Court to decide the case affected all religions.73  The third case, Rice v. Cayetano, dealt with the 
special status of Native Hawaiians under federal law.74   
Six tribal losses were truly Indian cases. Hodel v. Irving,75 and Babbitt v. Youpee, 76 struck 
as unconstitutional certain sections of the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Lyng v. Northwest 
Cemetery held that just about all federal actions negatively impacting Native American Sacred 
                                                          
68 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
69 For a general discussion of the case, see Alex T. Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the 
Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 47 (2004).   
70 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).  
71 For a discussion of the issue, see Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of a Crime: 
A Tribal and Congressional Imperative, 18 Mich. J. Race & L. 317, 358 (2013).  
72 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)(holding that the use of arguably racially offensive words in Trademarks is 
protected by the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.) The Holding in Matal v. Tan doomed the 
efforts of Indians to force the National Football League to abandon the “Redskins” trademark, see Pro-
Football v, Blackhorse, 112 F.Supp.3d 439 (2015).    
73 494 U.S. 872 (1990)(holding that criminal laws of general applicability that only incidentally impose 
burdens on the exercise of religion cannot be challenged under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.)  
74 528 U.S. 495 (2000)(holding that a law restricting voting in a State election to “Native Hawaiians” was a 
racial classification and therefore unconstitutional under the 15th Amendment. 
75 481 U.S. 704 (1987).  
76 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
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sites located on Federal land could not be challenged under the Free Exercise Clause because 
such actions did not substantially burden the religious practices of Native American 
practitioners.77 United States v. Cherokee Nation,78 involved the extent of the United States’ 
navigational servitude under the Commerce Clause. The last two cases, Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak,79 and Seminole Tribe v. Florida,80 prevented Indian nations from suing states 
in federal courts because of the states’ sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.81   
4. Administrative/Civil Procedure Law: 5 cases.  
There are only five cases in this category. Although tribal interests only won one of these 
cases, representing only a 20% win rate, this is by far the least important category since the cases 
here, while very important to the particular parties involved in each case, do not represent 
important precedents concerning the status of Indian Nations within the federal system.   
 The one win was in Arizona v. California.82  The case was also the most meaningful among 
the five cases in this category.  The decision held that the claim of the tribes and the United States 
to more water from the Colorado River was not precluded by previous decrees, nor was it barred 
under Res Judicata principles.       
Among the four losses, one case involved a tribe losing the right to sue in the Federal Court 
of Claims because the Tribe had already filed a substantially similar case in a federal district 
court.83  Another one held that the Administrative Procedure Act did not prevent the right of an 
Executive Agency to reprogram monies from one Indian program to another.84  In Oklahoma Tax 
Comm. v. Graham,85 the Court remanded a case which had been decided in the tribe’s favor but 
only because the case had been improperly removed to federal court.  Finally, in Menominee v. 
United States,86 the Court held that the statute of limitation contained in the Contract Dispute 
Act was applicable to a contract dispute between a tribe and the United States involving the 
Indian Self Determination Act.  
                                                          
77 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  For a more in-depth analysis of the case, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a 
Balanced Approached for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 Mich. J. of Race &Law 269, 
279-288 (2012).   
78 480 U.S. 700 (1987).  
79 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
80 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
81  The Eleventh Amendment provides as follows: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 
82 530 U.S. 392 (2000). 
83 United States v. Tohono O’Odham, 563 U.S. 307 (2011). 
84 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).  
85 489 U.S. 838 (1989). 
86 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).  
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5. Assessing the record based on the type of law used to decide the cases. 
Since 1988, tribes are most likely to lose cases based on constitutional or Procedural law although 
as stated earlier, the cases based on procedural law are not that meaningful.  Of the six losses in 
strictly Indian cases involving constitutional law, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 87 while undoubtedly 
very important to Indian interests, involved much more of a Federal versus State conflict than a 
Tribal versus State one. United States v. Cherokee Nation involved tribal interests but was not 
strictly speaking, decided on constitutional law dealing specifically with Indians.88    It is debatable 
whether Irving and Youpee are, strictly speaking, losses for tribal interests as the Court held that 
Congress could not without adequate compensation make individual Indians’ minimal interest in 
land escheat to the tribes.89  This leaves Lyng,90 the sacred site decision, and Village of Noatak 
holding that even though states can sue each other, Indian tribes cannot sue states because the 
tribes were not part of the “Plan of the Convention,”91 as the two most meaningful constitutional 
losses involving the rights of Indian nations within the federal system.  As stated earlier, United 
States v. Lara is the most meaningful tribal win in this category.92  
Refusing to use constitutional law to integrate Indian tribes as the third sovereign within our 
federalist system is not a dereliction of judicial duties.  While Indian tribes are acknowledged in 
the Constitution as political entities sovereign enough to have their own commerce with the 
United States,93 the extent of the Indian nations’ sovereignty is not defined.       
    The tribes’ chance of winning cases decided under federal common law which stands at 28% is 
not as good as winning cases based on statutory construction which have a 31.7% winning rate.  
Within the statutory construction category, tribal interests have the best chance of winning  cases 
dealing with interpretation of Indian specific legislation as tribes won six of the sixteen cases in 
this area, or 37.5% of the cases.  However, arguably the two most important statutory 
interpretation cases in this thirty-year period were losses in cases involving Indian specific 
legislation: The interpretation of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 in Carcieri,94 and the case 
interpreting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 in Village of Venetie.95 
The Court has historically left the role of governing the relations with the Indian nations 
to Congress, confirming that position relatively recently in United States v. Lara,96 a pivotal case 
                                                          
87 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See discussion at notes 74-80. 
88 480 U.S. 700 (1987) (determining the extent of the United States navigational servitude in the “waters 
of the United States.” 
89 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). See note 201, infra. 
90 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  
91 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
92 541 U.S. 193 (2004). See discussion, supra, at notes 66-673-64.  
93 The Commerce Clause, Article II, Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress 
shall have the power ….to regulate Commerce…. with the Indian Tribes;” 
94 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).  
95 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
96 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
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decided in 2004.  So one would think that most of the cases would be about statutes defining the 
relationships between the tribes, the states and the federal government.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
the Court uses Federal Common Law more than any other type of law when deciding cases 
involving tribal interests.  Among the cases decided on Federal Common law grounds, tribes only 
won in the area of tribal sovereign immunity, and fought successfully against assertion of tax 
jurisdiction by Oklahoma in the three cases involving the Oklahoma Tax Commission.  Otherwise, 
tribal interests lost all six cases involving assertion of tribal jurisdiction over non-members. The 
tribes also lost six cases involving state taxation of activities in Indian Country. Clearly, the Court 
used federal common law mostly to protect non-members against tribal sovereignty and to 
promote state sovereignty (through taxation) inside Indian Country.  “Indian Country” is a term 
of art defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151.  It includes all lands within Indian reservations as well as land 
held in trust or restricted fee by the United States for the benefit of Indians, and land set aside 
by the United States for Dependent Indian Communities.97  
B. THE RECORD WHEN CASES ARE DIVIDED ACCORDING TO SUBJECT MATTER.  
 In this section, instead of classifying the cases according to the type of law used to make 
the decision, the cases are classified according to four subject matter areas affecting tribal rights: 
Sovereign/Political Rights, Economic/Property Rights, Rights derived from the trust  Relationship, 
and Cultural/Religious Rights.  For the purposes of this section, I have not included Lincoln v. 
Vigil,98 or Oklahoma v. Graham.99 Although both are tribal losses, albeit relatively unimportant 
ones in the procedural category, they did not easily fit in any of the four categories named above.    
1. Sovereign/Political rights: 38.5 cases.  
This category concerns cases involving the sovereign rights of Indians tribes, either to assume 
jurisdiction over non-members, or claim sovereign immunity when being sued in state or federal 
court.  The section also concerns the sovereign rights of states to assume jurisdiction in Indian 
Country, or claim sovereign immunity when being sued by tribes. Also included are cases 
involving the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act.  
Most of the cases decided by the Court concerning tribal interests involve, in some fashion or 
another, the political or sovereign rights of the tribes, 38.5 out of 66 cases.  Cabazon is being 
counted as half a political rights case and half an economic rights case since it denied the states 
the jurisdiction to regulate gaming in Indian Country .  Brendale is being considered as half a loss 
and half a win for the tribes.100  The record, therefore, indicates that tribal interests suffered 26.5 
losses while winning 12 cases (30.2%).      
The 26.5 losses can be divided among cases extending or recognizing state power over Indian 
Country or Indian Affairs and cases that reduced tribal power.   
                                                          
97 18 U.S.C. 1151. 
98 508 U.S. 192 (2011) 
99 489 U.S. 838 (1989).  
100 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).  
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13 cases can be described as allowing State jurisdiction. While eight of these cases dealt with 
the authority of states to tax,101 one extended state criminal jurisdiction in Kansas,102  and three 
others diminished the extent of Indian country, thereby extending state general authority over 
these areas.103 Finally one case narrowed the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 
implicitly extending state authority over such cases.104  
13.5 cases can be described as negatively impacting tribal sovereignty: 7.5 cases denied tribal 
civil or criminal jurisdiction over non-members.105Five cases either prevented tribes from suing 
states,106 or refused to extend tribal sovereign immunity.107  Finally one case refused to limit 
election to the State Commission on Native Hawaiian affairs to Native Hawaiians.108  
Tribal interests won 12 cases; 9 reinforced the sovereign rights of Indian tribes,109 while 3 
negatively impacted state power by denying state taxing authority inside Indian Country.110   
                                                          
101 Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Department of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 
679 (1994), Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696 (1998), Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze 
Construction, 526 U.S. 32 (1999), City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), Wagnon v. 
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), County of Yakima v, Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 
251 (1992), and Cass County v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 103 (1998).  
102 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993). 
103 Alaska v. Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 
(1988), and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).  
104 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (Holding that a biological father who never had 
“custody” of his child is not eligible to take advantage of the Act to challenge an adoption proceeding.)  
105 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Nevada v. Hicks, 533 
U.S. 353 (2001), Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008),  Brendale 
v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1980) El Paso Natural gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999).  
106 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), , Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 
(1991), and Inyo County v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003).  
107 Lewis v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (refusing to extend tribal sovereign immunity to employee 
committing tort off the reservation by within the scope of his employment), C& L Enterprise v. Citizens 
Band of Potawatomi, 532 U.S. 422 (2001) (finding an explicit waiver of tribal sovereign immunity). 
108 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (1990). 
109  The tribal wins in this area include California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), Iowa Mutual v. 
Laplante, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016), Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. 
Ct. 1072 (2016), Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 124 U.S. 2024 (2014), Kiowa 
Tribe v. Manufacturing technologies, 523 U.S. 751 (1998), United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), and 
half of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990). 
110  Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Sac and Fox nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), Oklahoma Tax Commission, v. Chickasaw Nation, 
515 U.S. 450 (1995).  
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Among the 26.5 cases lost by the tribes, 15.5 were based on federal common law, 8 on 
statutory interpretation, and 3 on constitutional law. Among the 11.5 tribal wins, 7.5 were based 
on federal common law, 2 on statutory construction, and 2 on constitutional law.   
Of the 8 statutory construction cases involving political rights that the tribes lost, 3 involved 
the disestablishment of Indian country,111 one case interpreted a statute as conferring criminal 
jurisdiction on a state,112 one was an ICWA case,113 one case dealt with Native Hawaiians,114 and 
two cases allowed state taxation of fee patented land owned by Indians.115 The two cases won 
by tribal interests include one of the earlier case in the covered period, Holyfield,116 interpreting 
ICWA, and one of the very latest, Nebraska v. Parker,117 holding that an Indian reservation had 
not been disestablished.  
Although the numbers indicate that there was a disproportionate use of Federal Common 
law in this area, 24 cases, and that the Tribes won 31.2% of cases based on Federal common law, 
the odds of tribal interests winning cases based on statutory interpretation in this area was even 
less: 2 out of 9 or 22%.  In a somewhat curious twist, the tribes won 2 out of 5 or 40% of the cases 
based on constitutional law affecting tribal political rights.118 
2. Economic/property rights: 14.5 cases.  
This section concerns tribal rights that can be more easily described as property rights or 
economic rights. Not included in this category are cases where the Court was deciding the 
continued existence of Indian Country.  While such cases, such as the ones involving the 
disestablishment of Indian reservations have certainly some economic or property aspect to 
them, they are mostly about who, as between the tribes, the States or the federal government, 
can assume jurisdiction over certain issues. 
For these 14.5 cases, tribal interests won 5.5 cases and lost 9 which amounts to a 40% tribal 
win rate.  This indicates that Tribal interest are much more likely to win cases involving Tribal 
economic rights (40%) than any other category of cases. 
                                                          
111 Alaska v. Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), South Dakota v. 
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998).   
112 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993). 
113 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
114 Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009). 
115 Cass County v. Leech Lake, 524 U.S. 103 (1998), County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 
(1992).  
116 Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 20 (1989). 
117 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).  
118 The tribes won in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) and United States v. Brant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 
(2016). Tribes lost in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (1990), 
and Btalchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).  The winning percentage here is curious 
because overall, the tribes lost 9 of the 11 cases involving constitutional law.  See discussion supra at notes 
63-76.   
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The tribal losses consist of an eclectic bunch not easily categorized.  They range from an early 
case dealing with the subsistence rights of Native Alaskans,119 to a case allowing federal taxation 
of Indian gaming.120  Another three cases dealt with tribal attempts to confirm property rights in 
minerals,121 or submerged land.122  Two other cases did not allow minimal individual interests in 
land to escheat to tribes,123 while another applied the statute of limitations to a contract dispute 
between a tribe and the United States.124  Finally, another case allowed the state of Hawaii to 
continue the sale of lands that had been originally ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii.125  
The most meaningful tribal victory here was California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians,126 which is included in this section as counting for half a case since it is also included for 
half a case in the sovereign/political rights case in that it prevented state jurisdiction over Indian 
gaming.  Besides Cabazon, the tribal wins include two tribal contract disputes under the Indian 
Self-Determination Act,127 two cases interpreting treaties or agreements with Indian Nations,128 
and one Indian water rights case, Arizona v. California.129  
3. Rights derived from the Federal-trust relationship: 8 cases.    
There were 8 cases that, in some form or another, interpreted the trust relationship with 
the United States.130  Tribal interests only won one case, a breach of trust claim against the United 
States,131 and lost seven which amounts to only a 12.5% winning rate.  
  The tribal losses included three breach of trust claims.132  In two other cases, tribes 
attempted, without success, to apply the Indian trust doctrine to non-Indian statutes and 
                                                          
119 Amoco Production v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).  
120 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) 
121 Amoco Production v. Southern Ute tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999). 
122 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene 521 U.S. 261 (1997), United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987).   
123 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
124 Menominee v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).  
125 Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009).  
126 480 U.S. 202 (1987).  
127 Salazar v. Ramah Navajo, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012), Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005). 
128 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 
(2001).  
129 530 U.S. 392 (2000).  
130 Since 1831, when Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, described the Indian tribes as 
domestic dependent nations whose relationship with the United States resembled that of a ward to its 
guardian,  30 U.S. 1 at 17, the political relationship between the United States and the tribes has been 
described as a trust relationship.  Under that relationship, tribes are the beneficiary of the trust and the 
United States is the trustee.  For a comprehensive treatment of the trust doctrine see Mary Christina 
Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 
1471 (1994).       
131 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).  
132 United States v. Navajo Nation, I and II, 537 U.S. 488 (2003), and 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (both cases finding 
that no statutes allowed the Navajo Nation the right to sue the United states for breach of trust). United 
States v. Tohono O’Odham, 563 U.S. 307 (2011), is included here although the Tribe lost the right to sue 
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doctrines.133  Finally, in Patchak, the Court allowed non-Indian individuals to challenge the United 
States’ decision to take land into trust for Indian tribes,134  while in Carcieri v. Salazar 135  it 
restricted the application of section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act to tribes under federal 
jurisdiction as of 1934.136  The low rate of tribal wins in this area clearly indicates that the Court 
is construing trust obligations narrowly,137 and does not want to extend general principles of trust 
law to the Indian trust doctrine unless specifically mandated to do so by Congress.138    
4. Cultural/Religious Rights: 3 cases. 
There are only three cases in this category and, unfortunately, tribal interests lost every 
one of them.  Two of the cases were not concerned with any doctrines of federal Indian law, 
Matal v. Tam, 139  and Employment Division v. Smith. 140  The third one did not allow Indian 
practitioners to invoke the protection of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause to protect Sacred 
Sites located on Federal land.141  
C. THE RECORD WHEN THE CASES ARE CONSIDERED BASED ON RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
AND ALONG TIME LINES.  
Although this is a subjective count, among the cases that are the most important in Federal 
Indian Law from a precedential perspective, the survey indicates that there were 8 tribal victories 
and 16 defeats.  In other words, in the last thirty years, for every meaningful tribal victory, there 
were two important tribal defeats.  On the other hand, this means that tribal interests won 
33.33% of these important cases which is a higher percentage of wins that the tribal average for 
all cases (28%).   
The tribal wins are an eclectic mix.  They include Iowa Mutual v. Laplante (exhaustion of tribal 
court remedies doctrine), 142  California v. Cabazon Band (state jurisdiction over gaming 
preempted,)143  Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield (ICWA), 144  Kiowa Tribe and Bay Mills (tribal 
                                                          
the United States in the Federal Court of Claims only because it had already filed a similar case in Federal 
District Court. 
133 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011) (refusing to apply the trust doctrine to the 
attorney-client privilege), and Dept. of Interior v. Klamath River Water Users, 530 U.S. 495 (2000) (refusing 
to apply the trust doctrine to exceptions contained in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  
134 Match-E-B-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 219 (2012). 
135 555 U.S. 379 (2009). 
136 Section 5, codified at 25 U.S.C 465, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for 
the benefit of Indians. 
137 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).  
138 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011).  
139 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
140 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
141 See Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).   
142 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
143 480 U.S. 202 (1987).  
144 490 U.S. 30 (1989).   
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sovereign immunity),145 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band (Treaty interpretation,)146 and Nebraska v. 
Parker (existence of Indian Country).147 
The tribal losses include seven against state interests.148  Five of the cases that reduced tribal 
sovereignty over non-members. 149  Three that involved the trust relationship. 150  One that 
involved protection of an Indian sacred site.151    
It is important to note that the overall percentage of tribal wins in the last thirty years, while 
not great (28%), has increased since Professor Getches published his 2001 survey (23%).152 
However, if one looks at the percentages of tribal wins when the cases are divided into ten year 
increments, the future looks brighter for tribal interests than it did previously.  From the 1986-
87 term to the 1996-97 term, the Court adjudicated 25 cases.  Of these, 18.5 were tribal losses, 
and 6.5 wins,153 amounting to a 26% tribal win rate.  From the 1997-98 term to the 2006/07 
term, the Court also heard 25 cases.  The tribal interests lost 18 cases, while winning 7.154  This 
                                                          
145 Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, 523 U.S. 751 (1998), Michigan v. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. 2024 
(2014).    
146 526 U.S. 172 (1999).  
147 Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).  
148 Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 622 U.S. 520 
(1998), Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991), Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996),  Adoptive Couple V. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 
U.S. 197 (2005), Cass County v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 172 (1999).  
149 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) , Nevada v. Hicks, 533 
U.S. 353 (2001), Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family 
Land, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).  
150 U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011), and 
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).  
151 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).     
152 See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra at note 12. 
153 The two most important wins for the tribes during that decade were California v. Cabazon Band, 480 
U.S. 202 (1987) (No state jurisdiction over Tribal gaming) and Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 
30 (1989) (ICWA).  Meaningful losses include Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (State 
taxation), Strate v. A-1 Contractors, (No tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members) 520 U.S. 438 (1997), 
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians), Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (State retained sovereign immunity in spite of IGRA,) and Lyng v.  
Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No constitutional protection for Indian sacred site 
located on federal land).   
154 Among the more meaningful tribal wins in this decade are Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, 
523 U.S. 751 (1998) (Tribal Sovereign Immunity), Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (Treaty 
Rights), and United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Congressional power to overturn implicit 
divestiture cases).  Important losses include Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (No tribal civil jurisdiction 
over non-members),  Alaska v. Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (Land owned in Fee by Indians 
pursuant to ANCSA not Indian Country), U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (No U.S. liability for 
breach of trust in management of tribal natural resources),  Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 
(2001)(No tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members), and Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) 
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amounts to a 28% Tribal win rate. From the 2007/08 until the 2016/17 term, there was only 16 
cases.  11 cases were tribal losses, and 5 tribal wins.155  This represents a 31.2 tribal win rate.  
Although the tribal win rate increased in each successive decade, the positive or pro-tribal 
trend is even more striking when one compares the first 15 years (1987-88 term until the 2000-
01 term) with the last fifteen years (2001-02 term until the 2016-17 term.)  The tabulation shows 
that there were 43 cases decided in the first 15 years with the tribal interests losing 32.5 cases 
while only winning 10.5 cases, representing a 24.4% rate of tribal wins.  However, in the last 
fifteen years, there were only 23 cases. However, of these 23 cases, Tribal interests won 8 cases 
while losing 15.  This represents a 34.7% rate of tribal wins and may indicate that, for the tribes, 
the worst is behind them and there might indeed be a light at the end of this anti tribal 
sovereignty tunnel.  Besides the Court being more receptive to Indian tribes as the third sovereign 
within our federalism, other factors may have contributed to this rather abrupt drop in the 
number of cases decided as well as the increase in the percentage of tribal wins.  One of these 
factors could be the creation of the Tribal Supreme Court Project, a joint effort by the Native 
American Rights Fund and the National Congress of American Indians, to more closely monitor 
and control the kind of cases appealed to the Supreme Court by tribal interests.156    
PART III: LOOKING FOR EQUILIBRIUM OR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY?   
A. Evaluating Congressional response to the Court’s decisions, and the Court’s reaction to federal 
legislation.  
1. Congressional response.  
Congress is said to have “plenary power” over Indian Affairs, 157 and it is the Institution 
the Constitution, mostly through the Indian Commerce Clause, vested with primacy over Indian 
affairs.158  Recently, one scholar has argued that it is normatively right for Congress to take the 
                                                          
(Classification of Native Hawaiians for the purpose of voting in state elections are racial classifications 
reviewed under strict scrutiny).   
155 Meaningful tribal wins in this decade include Michigan v. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014)(Tribal 
sovereign Immunity) and  Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2017 )which is included as an important 
case because it may represent a turning point on how the Court determines whether Indian reservations 
have been disestablished.  Important tribal losses include Pains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & 
Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008)(no tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members), United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 564 U.S. 162 (2011)(Trust doctrine not applicable to interpret FOIA,  Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013) (Applicability of ICWA) and Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (section 5 of IRA only 
applicable to tribes under federal jurisdiction as of 1934).   
156 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra at note 14, at p.......  
157 For instance, in Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989), the Court stated “the 
central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in 
the field of Indian affairs.” 
158 The Commerce Clause, Article II, Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress 
shall have the power ….to regulate Commerce…. with the Indian Tribes.” For a thorough look at the various 
sources of congressional power over Indian Affairs, see Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce 
Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1012 (2015).  
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leading role in Indian Affairs because it has the better institutional capacity to formulate sound 
policies governing federal relations with Indian Nations, 159  while another one showed that 
Congress is still very active in formulating federal Indian policy.160  Others have argued, however,  
that Congress has ceded its leading role to the Court.161  Consistent with the views expressed in 
Law and Equilibrium,162 it is true that Congress and the Court, and at times the Executive Branch, 
are involved in a kind of dialogue with each other.  As once stated by Justice Ginsburg:” judges… 
participate in a dialogue with other organs of government.”163 In this section, I analyze the 
interrelationship between the Court and Congress in the field of Federal Indian Law to 
understand the nature of the dialogue and determine if the Court has taken control over such 
dialogue.164   
Professor Matthew Fletcher has persuasively shown that, generally speaking, “modern 
congressional statements” in Federal Indian policy support tribal self-government, tribal tax 
authority and economic development, as well as tribal sovereign immunity and the development 
of tribal courts.165  This section focuses only on legislation enacted specifically as a response to a 
Supreme Court decision in order to evaluate Congressional willingness to retain primacy over 
Indian affairs.    This section is not a comprehensive survey.  It is not pretending to be all inclusive 
of all Indian legislation that may have been partially motivated or influenced by former Supreme 
Court decisions.  Although many tribe-specific legislation, whether it be land claims or water 
rights settlements, are somewhat related to former Supreme Court decisions, this section does 
not analyze all congressional legislation remotely related to Supreme Court decisions.       
a. Indian Gaming.  
Perhaps the most interesting case study involving the interaction between the legislative, 
judicial, and Executive branches in the field of Indian Affairs is in the area of Indian gaming.  As is 
well documented, although Congress had been working on legislation to regulate Indian gaming, 
it is only after the Court issued its 1987 decision in California v. Cabazon,166  that Congress was 
                                                          
159 See Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 85 U. 
Colo. L. Rev 759 (2014). 
160 Kirsten Carlson, Congress and Indians, supra at note 25 at p. at 148-149. 
161 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 121 (2006).  
162 See Eskridge & Frickey Law as Equilibrium, supra at note 16.  
163 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992).  See also 
Lawrence Friedman The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 Hasting 
Const. L. Q. 93 (2000), Maimon Schwarzchild, Pluralism, Conversation, and Judicial Restraint, 95 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 961 (2001) (discussing when court decisions encourage democratic conversations with the other 
branches.)  
164 For a comprehensive study of the dynamic relationship between the Court’s decision and Congress on 
all issues see, William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
Yale L.J. 331 (1991).  
165 See Fletcher Federal Indian Policy, supra at note 11, at pp. 140-150.   
166 480 U.S. 202 (1987).  
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able to muster the political will to enact the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA).167  
Eight years after IGRA was enacted into law, the Court reacted and declared the part of IGRA 
allowing Tribes to sue States for failing to negotiate a tribal state compact in good faith 
unconstitutional.168  While that decision did not generate a congressional reaction in the Indian 
gaming area, the Executive Branch took up the challenge and enacted new regulations allowing 
tribes to by-pass an assertion of state sovereign immunity by allowing them to ask the Secretary 
of the Interior to issue Class III gaming procedures.169 So far, the power of the Secretary to issue 
such procedures has been struck down by two circuits,170 but the Court has not yet decided to 
take a case challenging the validity of the regulations.  
b. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-member Indians.  
Congress also reacted to the Court’s decisions to divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction over 
non-member Indians and non-Indians.  Congress enacted the so-called Duro Fix,171 overturning 
the Court’s 1990 decision in Duro v. Reina.172  Congress eventually also partially overturned or 
modified Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian tribe,173  by enacting the 2013 VAWA Amendments.174  
There was a challenge to the Congress’s power to overturn or modify cases such as Duro 
and Oliphant, but the Court in United States v. Lara ruled that these former decisions were based 
on Federal common law and not constitutional law.175  Therefore, the results in such cases could 
be modified by Congress.176 Whether non-members can be prosecuted in tribal courts without 
the full protection of the United State Constitution has not yet been decided.177  
                                                          
167 For comprehensive analysis, see Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Background 
and Legislative History, 42 Ariz. St. L. J. 99 (2010), Robert N. Clinton, Enactment of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act of 1988:  The Return of the Buffalo to Indian Country or Another Federal Usurpation of 
Tribal Sovereignty, 42 Ariz. St. L. J. 17 (2010).   
168 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)(holding that Congress could not use its Commerce Clause 
powers to abrogate the States’ 11th Amendment sovereign immunity.) 
169 The final regulations were issued in 1999.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 17,535 -36, codified at 25  C.F. R. 291.  
170 See Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied. 129 C. Ct. 32 (2008), New Mexico 
v. Department of the Interior, 854 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2017). For an argument supporting the Secretary’s 
authority to issue such regulations, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 
42 Ariz. St. L. J. 253, 293-296 (criticizing the Fifth Circuit opinion).  
171 P.L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat 646 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 1301).     
172 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
173 435 U.S. 191 (1978).     
174 25 U.S.C., 1304. For background and implementation of the 2013 VAWA Amendments,  See Angela R. 
Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1564 (2016). 
175 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004).  
176 For in depth analysis of the decision and its background, see Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara 
as a Story of Native Agency, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 5 (2004). See also, Alex Tallchief Skibine, United states v. Lara, 
Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 48 (2004). 
177  See Note, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction after United States v. Lara: Answering the Constitutional 
Challenge to the Duro Fix, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 847 (2005). See also Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal 
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c. Indian land Consolidation Act:178  
On an issue of much less interest to the non-Indian world, the Court twice struck as 
unconstitutional provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act allowing very small interests in 
land owned by tribal members to escheat to their tribe under certain conditions.179  Each time, 
the Congress reacted by enacting a new version of the law.  The first ILCA was enacted in 1983.180        
An amended version attempting to resolve the constitutional issues was enacted in 1984 but 
declared unconstitutional in Babbitt v. Youpee.181  A third version was enacted in 2000, but was 
replaced before it could be implemented by the 2004 American Indian Probate Reform Act.182  
d. Overturning Patchak:  
Following the Court’s decision in Mach-E-B-Nash-She-Wish v. Patchak, 183   which had 
allowed a non-tribal member to challenge a decision by the Secretary of the Interior to transfer 
some land to the tribe from fee to trust, Congress enacted the 1994 Gun Lake Trust Land 
Reaffirmation Act.184 That Act attempts to overturn or, perhaps, moot the Court’s decision in 
Patchak by reaffirming the Secretary’s decision to take the land into trust and directing the 
dismissal of any action (future or pending) challenging such fee to trust transfer. The Court has 
recently, however,  granted cert to review the constitutionality of this legislation.185  The grant of 
cert may seem unusual as the case only concerns a tribe specific statute.  However, the legal 
principles involved are important since they involve the power of Congress to affect the result 
reached in previous court decisions. This case provides a good segue to the next section since it 
discusses the Court’s reaction to other congressional legislation. 
2. The Court’s Reaction to Congressional legislation:   
This section evaluates the Court’s reaction to congressional legislation to determine if the 
Court is looking for a political equilibrium and cares about reaching results consistent with the 
positions of Congress on Indian issues. 
a. Interpreting IGRA.  
As stated earlier, the Court struck part of IGRA as unconstitutional in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida.186  The Court also interpreted IGRA as allowing federal taxation of tribal gaming revenues 
                                                          
Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA 
L. Rev. 553 (2009). 
178 25 U.S.C. 2201-2219  
179 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), and Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997).  
180 P.L. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2517. 
181 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
182 P.L. 106-462. 114 Stat. 1992. 
183 132 S. Ct. 219 (2012). 
184 Pub. L. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913.  
185 See Patchak v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017)( granting cert on May 1, 2017).  
186 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See discussion at notes 165-169.  
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in Chickasaw Nation v. United States.187  While Seminole Tribe obviously upset the carefully 
crafted balance reached by Congress between tribal and state interests in tribal gaming within 
Indian Country, the decision was part of a much larger debate among the Justices concerning the 
extent of Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Because it affected much more than just Indian-
specific statutes, the decision was part of a much larger controversy between Congress and the 
Court concerning the extent of Congressional power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the 
States.   
However, the refusal of the Court to allow Tribes to sue state official using the Ex Parte 
Young doctrine reflects a profound disagreement with the Congressional policies enunciated in 
IGRA.188  As I argued elsewhere, that policy revealed a congressional desire to include tribes into 
a model of what some have termed cooperative federalism,  
[f]ederal statutes in the new Tribal Self-Governance Era… have progressively adopted 
what could be described as a compact model…. These statutes can be seen as 
incorporating or integrating Indian tribes as sovereign political entities within “Our 
Federalism” and creating what could be called a system of cooperative federalism 
between the tribes and the federal government.189  
Although I also pointed that IGRA was different from the typical cooperative federalism statute 
in that it directly involved the states in the negotiation of compacts,190 I also believed that IGRA 
could fit “in the concept of cooperative federalism, a concept which should be based on tri-lateral 
agreements between the tribes, the federal government, and the states.”191  
b. Interpreting ANCSA.  
In Venetie, 192  the Court reacted to enactment of the 1971 Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) by holding that land set aside for Native Corporations under the Act was 
not Indian Country.  Therefore, the State of Alaska could tax activities taking place on those lands.  
The Court achieved this remarkable result by insisting that lands set aside by Congress for 
dependent Indian Communities, such as Alaskan Native Villages, could only qualify as “Indian 
Country” for the purpose of section 1151 if such lands also remained in control of the federal 
                                                          
187 534 U.S. 84 (2001) 
188 For a critique of that aspect of the Court’s opinion, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and 
Cooperative Federalism, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 253, 297-300. 
189 Id., at 285-287 (2010). 
190 Typical statutes embodying a cooperative federalism model include the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 101-459, 
104 Stat. 2399, the Safe drinking Water Act, Pub. L. 99-339, 100 Stat 642, and the Clean Water Act, Pub. 
L. 100-4, 101 Stat 7.  Indian tribes are included in the statutes as being able to be treated as States and 
assume primacy over the reservations’ air and water resources.  
191 Id., at 287. 
192 Alaska v. Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).   
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government.193 Because Native Alaskan villages held their lands in fee, the federal government 
did not have complete control over such lands. Therefore, such lands could not qualify as Indian 
Country.194           
c. Interpreting ICWA:   
Since its enactment in 1978, the Court has only interpreted the Indian Child Welfare Act 
twice.  From a pro tribal interpretation in Holyfield in 1988,195 the Court in 2013 came up with a 
very narrow interpretation of the law in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.196  This new interpretation  
severely limits the instances where biological Indian fathers could invoke the protection of ICWA 
when intervene in adoption proceedings.  
d. Interpreting section 5 of the IRA. 
Section 5 allows the Secretary to transfer land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes.197   
For years, the Secretary had construed that section as applying to all Indian tribes as long as such 
tribes were under federal jurisdiction as of the date of each land transfer.  At the urging of the 
states, the Court in Carcieri gave a very narrow interpretation to the Indian Reorganization Act 
restricting application of Section 5 to those tribes under federal jurisdiction as of 1934.198  The 
Court was able to reach this result by surprisingly claiming that there was no ambiguity 
whatsoever in the statute and, therefore, Chevron deference was not applicable.199  In doing so, 
the Court set aside a thirty year old formal regulation of the Interior Department which had 
interpreted the statute as only requiring that a tribe be under federal jurisdiction at the time the 
land was transferred into trust.200  
e. Indian Land Consolidation Act. 
                                                          
193 Although 18 U.S.C. 1151 defines what lands qualify as Indian Country for the purpose of criminal 
jurisdiction, the definition has been applied to civil jurisdictional issues.  
194 For a critical evaluation of the Court's reasoning in Venetie, see Kristen Carpenter, Interpreting Indian 
Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 Tulsa L.J. 73 (1999); see also David M. Burton, 
Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis, and Dependent Indian Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 
Alaska L. Rev. 37 (1998).  
195  Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 20 (1989) (Coming up with a national 
definition of “domicile” preventing Indian mother from avoiding application of ICWA by giving birth off 
the reservation).    
196 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).  
197 Codified at 25 U.S.C. 465.  
198 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).  
199  Under Chevron deference, courts are supposed to give deference to interpretation by Executive 
Departments in charge of implementing ambiguous statutes as long as such Departments were delegated 
by Congress the power to make such interpretations.  
200 For critical perspectives on Carcieri, see, William Wood, Indians, Tribes and “Federal” Jurisdiction, 65 
U. Kan. L. Rev. 415 (2016), Sarah Washburn, Comment, Distinguishing Carcieri v. Salazar: Why the Supreme 
Court Got It Wrong and How Congress and Courts Should Respond to Preserve Tribal and Federal Interests 
in the IRA's Trust-Land Provisions, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 603 (2010). 
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As noted earlier, the Court struck down as unconstitutional parts of the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act twice.201  It is interesting to note that in each of the five examples cited above, 
the Court ruled against the tribal interests.  However, of the five statutes, only the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act generated a congressional response.202  This shows that if tribal interests are 
not in direct conflict with the interests of states or important non-Indian interests, Congress is 
ready and willing to correct Supreme Court decisions.203   The next sub-section makes this point 
even clearer.  
f. Interpreting the Indian Self Determination Act. 
In 1988 and 1994, Congress amended the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975. 204   In 
Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 205  the Supreme Court unanimously interpreted the 1988 
Amendments as mandating the funding of “Contract Support Costs” associated with Self-
Determination contracts entered into between the United States and the tribes.  Contract 
support costs are “reasonable costs” that a federal agency would not have incurred, but which 
tribes are incurring in managing such programs.206  Even though the 1988 Amendments provided 
that funding under the Act shall be contingent on availability of appropriations and Congress had 
not earmarked enough funds to cover all contract support costs, the Court reasoned that 
Congress had still appropriated sufficient unrestricted funds to cover the full amount of those 
contract support costs.  
Aware of this problem, Congress later enacted Appropriation Bills with language providing 
that contract support costs available to tribes should be capped at an amount “not to exceed” 
amounts appropriated by Congress for this activity.   Yet, in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo 
Chapter,207 the Court, this time in a 5-4 decision, still held that the United States was obligated 
to award each tribe the full amount of contract support costs negotiated in the previous 
contracts. 
Unlike previous statutory interpretation cases where the Court interpreted legislation 
narrowly to restrict tribal rights, in this case, in spite of Congress’s attempts to restrict tribal 
funding through specific language in Appropriation Bills, the Court stood firmly with the tribes 
                                                          
201 See discussion at notes 74-75. 
202 Some may also question whether the “Supreme Court decisions in Irving and Youpee are actually anti-
Indian.  See for instance Baca, 40 Years of U.S. Supreme Court, supra at note 14, classifying the two 
decisions as Indian victories.   
203 The Court may revisit the Indian Land Consolidation Act if it grants cert to a petition asking whether 
the Act allows the United States to take land into trust for a tribe that opted out of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 and for which the United States currently does not hold land in trust.  See 
Town v. Vernon v. United States, Docket No. 17-8, Petition for Cert filed on 6/23/17.  
204 P.L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203, codified as amended t 25 U.S.C. 450 et. seq. amended by P.L. 100—472, 102 
Stat. 2285 in 1988 and further amended in 1994 by P.L. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250. 
205 543 U.S. 631 (2005).  
206 See 25 U.S.C. 450j-1(a)(2). 
207 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).  
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in upholding the contractual obligations of the United States.  In effect, the Court put the onus 
on Congress to amend the Indian Self-Determination Act one more time or be obligated to 
fund all tribal contract support costs associated with Self-Determination contracts.       
3. The Road not Taken. 
Sometimes, congressional or judicial silence on an issue can speak as much as enacted 
legislation and judicial decisions. In this section, I first enumerate five key issues where tribal 
interests have failed to generate legislation.  I then conclude by listing three areas where anti 
tribal interests have not succeeded in motivating Congress to act.  
a. Tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members:  
As opposed to cases involving criminal jurisdiction, none of the civil jurisdiction cases 
preventing tribal jurisdiction over non-members in Indian Country have been overturned.208  
Congressional silence and lack of any reaction, either for or against tribal jurisdiction in this area 
speaks volume about either a lack of concern with such cases, or an inability to address such 
issues through legislation.  Perhaps the lack of concern can be explained by the fact that in many 
of those cases, the tribal court plaintiff could sue the non-member in a state or federal court.  On 
the other hand, congressional inaction here can be explained by the fact that the non-tribal 
members potentially affected by such legislation have considerable more lobbying power as a 
group than non-members accused of committing crimes in Indian Country as was the case in Duro 
and Oliphant. 
In a recent article, Professor Berger proposed three reasons explaining the Court’s anti-
tribal slant: First, the Justices are unfamiliar with how tribal governments operate. Secondly, the 
Justices are concerned that non-members are not fully protected by the United States 
Constitution when appearing in tribal courts. Finally, Indian nations are not seen by the Court as 
truly sovereign governments in charge of governing their territories. 209  The same concerns 
generated by unfamiliarity, lack of constitutional protection, and mixed feelings about tribal 
sovereignty, could be operating also at the congressional level to dim any chances of restoring 
tribal civil jurisdiction through legislation.  However, it should be noted that although not enacted 
as a direct reaction to any Supreme Court case, Congress did amend the major environmental 
statutes to allow tribes to potentially be treated as States under those statutes.  Such treatment 
would allow tribes to regulate the activities of non-members in this area.210  Perhaps any future 
                                                          
208  South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), Atkinson 
Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), and Plains Commerce Bank 
v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008). The tribes also lost half of Brendale v. 
Confederated tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).  
209 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra at note 14 at pages………... 
210 See the Indian Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
1377 (e) and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 USC 300j-11(a).  See also Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th 
Cir. 2001).  
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tribal efforts in this area should focus on specific areas of civil jurisdiction instead of painting with 
a wider brush.211     
b. Pre-empting state tax jurisdiction in Indian Country.   
As stated earlier, 8 cases allowed states to tax activities on Indian reservations.212  The 
Court has allowed such taxation by either slightly modifying its Indian preemption analysis,213 or 
finding  that the tax did not occur in Indian Country.214  In all these cases, the Court allowed state 
taxation by finding that the legal incidence of the tax did not fall on the Indian tribes.215 Finally, 
in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,216 the Court invoked the doctrine of laches to prevent 
the Tribe from challenging a State tax because a successful challenge would otherwise upset the 
long held and legitimate expectations of non-Indians.217  
c. Enacting a Seminole fix.  
Legislation is needed to resolve the ambiguities created by Seminole Tribe v. Florida.218  In 
Seminole Tribe, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a section of IGRA allowing the tribes 
to sue states in federal court for failure to negotiate a tribal state gaming compact on good 
faith.219  The unresolved question is whether the Secretary of the Interior can issue Class III 
gaming procedures upon being petitioned to do so by a tribe whose lawsuit against a state was 
                                                          
211 On the other hand, Congress has allowed some state civil jurisdiction in legislation settling tribal land 
claims and/or recognizing or restoring some tribes to federal recognition.  See for instance, The 
Wampanoag Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-95, 101 Stat. 704.  See also the 1988 Act 
establishing a reservation for the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community, Pub. L. 100-425, 
102 Stat. 1594, and the Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-393, 100 Stat. 849.  
212 See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Department of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 
U.S. 679 (1994), Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696 (1998), Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze 
Construction, 526 U.S. 32 (1999), City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), Wagnon v. 
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), County of Yakima v, Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 
251 (1992), and Cass County v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 103 (1998).  
213 See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1988), Department of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 
U.S. 61 (1994). 
214 See Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).  
215 For a critical analysis, see Alex T. Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 
Am. Ind. L. Rev. 391, at 428-430 (2007-08),  
216 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
217  For a critical analysis of the decision, see Joseph William Singer, None-Tenths of the Law: Title, 
Possession, and Sacred Obligations, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 605 (2006). 
218 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
219  The Court held that Congress could not use its Commerce Clause power to abrogate the States’ 
sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
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dismissed on account of sovereign immunity. Two Circuits have ruled that the Secretary cannot 
issue such regulations.220  No amendment to IGRA on this issue seems to be forthcoming.221 
d. Recognizing Native Hawaiians.  
Although so far, Native Hawaiians lost both Supreme Court cases affecting their 
interests,222 Congress tried but was unable to enact any kind of legislation recognizing Native 
Hawaiians as a political group.223 However, on September 29, 2015, the Obama Administration, 
through the Department of the Interior, announced that it was amending its regulations to allow 
Native Hawaiians to apply for federal recognition as an Indian tribe.224      
e. Overturning Carcieri.  
So far, tribal efforts to enact a Carcieri Fix have been unsuccessful although Indian nations 
may not be unitied in the effort to overturn the decision.225  Under Carcieri, in order to be eligible 
to receive land into trust under the IRA’s section 5, a tribe had to be under federal jurisdiction in 
1934.226   
f. Repealing Section 5 of the IRA. 
On the other hand, in spite of concerted efforts by the States to challenge implementation 
of section 5 of the IRA,227 or declare the section unconstitutional,228 the Court never came close 
to holding the Section unconstitutional. The Court did grant cert in Department of the Interior v. 
                                                          
220 See New Mexico v. Department of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2017), Texas v. United States, 497 
F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).  For a critique of the decision, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and 
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Justifying the Secretary of Interior’s Seminole Fix for the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 40 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 
325 (2015-16).  
221  See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 Harv. J. on Leg. 39 (2007) 
(Recommending Amendments to IGRA).    
222 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000),  Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009). 
223 For a description of such legislative efforts, see Note, The Akaka Bill: The Native Hawaiians Race for 
Federal Recognition, 23 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 857 (2001).    
224  See Department of the Interior Press Release, 9/29/2015, Interior Proposes Re-establishing 
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225 See e.g. Note, Beyond the Carcieri Fix: The Need for Broader Reform of the Land into Trust Process of 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1377 (2011).  
226 For an argument that most if not all Indian Tribes were under federal Jurisdiction as of 1934, see 
William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) Jurisdiction, 65 U. Kansas L. Rev. 415 (2016). 
227 Section 5 allows the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for the benefit of Indians.  For a 
critique of the implementation of Section 5, see Note, Extreme Rubber Stamping: The Fee to Trust Process 
under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 251 (2014).  
228 See for instance, City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  Section 5 has been attacked 
as being unconstitutional as an overbroad delegation of power to the Secretary of the Interior.  Section 5 
has also been attacked as being in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Tenth 
Amendment provides that all powers not delegated to the Congress are reserved to the States.   
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South Dakota,229 but proceeded on issuing a GVR, remanding the case for reconsideration to the 
Secretary of the Interior without writing a substantial opinion. 230  Congress on the other hand, 
did amend the Indian Reorganization Act in 1988 to allow tribes who had initially rejected the Act 
to be able to benefit from Section 5.231      
g. Abrogating tribal Sovereign Immunity 
In Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies,232 the Court strongly implied that Congress 
should consider restricting the scope of tribal sovereign immunity.233  Yet, after considering the 
issue in connection with enactment of the Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts 
Encouragement Act of 2000,234 Congress opted against any major revisions to the doctrine.235 
h. Amending ICWA.  
Anti-ICWA interest groups efforts to amend the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),236 have 
also gone nowhere, legislatively speaking. Although Bills to amend ICWA have been introduced, 
Congress has so far not enacted any new amendments to this legislation.237  On the same subject, 
even though many have and continue to challenge some sections of ICWA as being 
                                                          
229 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996). 
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context, immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know 
of tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims. These considerations 
might suggest a need to abrogate tribal immunity, at least as an overarching rule… Respondent does not 
ask us to repudiate the principle outright, but suggests instead that we confine it to reservations or to 
noncommercial activities. We decline to draw this distinction in this case, as we defer to the role Congress 
may wish to exercise in this important judgment.) 
234 P.L. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (2000) (amending 25 U.S.C. 81.) 
235 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-501 (2000), S. Rep No. 106-150 (1999).  
236 25 U.S.C. sections 1901-1923 (2000) 
237 See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints under the Indian Child Welfare Act, Toward a New Understanding 
of State Court Resistance, 51 Emory. L. J. 587 (2002) (discussing the major controversies and 
disagreements involving ICWA.) 
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unconstitutional,238 the Supreme Court has never granted cert to any such cases.239  It should be 
noted, however, that in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Court stated that parts of ICWA would 
raise equal protection issues if the interpretation of the South Carolina Supreme Court was 
upheld.240  
Conclusion to Part III A:   
In a recent Article analyzing in depth the actions of Congress concerning Indians, Professor 
Kirsten Carlson found that Indian tribes were surprisingly adept at persuading Congress to enact 
legislation favorable to tribal interests.241 As the Patchak legislation shows,242 this is undoubtedly 
true when it comes to getting Congress to enact tribe specific bills or legislation not opposed by 
states or powerful non-Indian interests.  Otherwise, the only major pan-tribal successes involving 
congressional reaction to Supreme Court decisions in the last thirty years have been the 
enactment of IGRA, the Duro Fix, and the 2013 VAWA Amendments.  There have been, of course, 
many other tribal legislative successes.  But such successes, like for instance, the Tribal Law & 
Order Act, 243 have not been the result of a direct congressional reaction to a Supreme Court case.  
Tribal interests, however, have been more adept at preventing anti-tribal bills from being 
enacted into law. Thus, major pro-tribal legislation like the IRA, IGRA, and ICWA have not been 
amended in a way adverse to tribal interests. However, the same thing could be said of anti -
tribal interests capabilities to stymie pro-tribal legislation. It is telling that Congress was able to 
revisit the ILCA twice and has made numerous amendments to the ISDA, yet tribal legislative 
efforts to fix IGRA in the wake of Seminole Tribe, reaffirm tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
members, or preempt state taxation in Indian Country, have all been stalled.  
The record confirms that it is much easier to kill rather than enact legislation.244  Many have 
written about congressional gridlock and the Court is, of course, aware of this phenomenon.245  
In the next section of this Article, I argue that this awareness has emboldened the Court to use 
judge-made law to promote its own agenda and policies in Indian Country without any fears of 
upsetting any equilibrium that may have been reached with Congress.   
                                                          
238 For a summary of current cases, see Matthew Newman and Kathryn Fort, Legal Challenges to ICWA: 
An Analysis of Current Case Law, 36 NO.1 Child L. Prac. 13 (2017). 
239 However, one cert petition is still pending at the time of this writing, see S.S. v. Colorado River Indian 
Tribes, Docket No. 17-95, Petition for Cert filed on 7/17/17.  
240 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013).  
241 See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Tribes Lobbying Congress: Who Wins and Why, Draft Report Presented at 
the Michigan State University’s 13th Annual Indigenous Law Conference (2017) at pp. 9-12.   
242 See discussion, supra, at notes 180-182. Although the last chapter in this saga has still not been written 
as the Court recently granted cert to a petition challenging the constitutionality of that law.   
243 Pub. L. 11-211, 124 Stat 2261. 
244 See William N. Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441 (2008).  
245 See, Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Power, 2013 Wisc. L. Rev. 1097 
(2013), Michael, J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2107 (2013), Michael J. Teter, 
Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2217 (2013).  
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B. Looking for a different kind of equilibrium: The Court’s use of Federal Common law:  
As stated earlier, the Court uses Federal common law more than any other type of law in 
its Indian law jurisprudence.  Moreover, the Court’s most active use of federal common law is to 
protect non-members from tribal jurisdiction and promote state jurisdiction inside Indian 
reservations.  In this section, I argue that rather than looking for an equilibrium with Congress, 
the Court is using federal common law to impose its own version of what the equilibrium 
between tribal and non-tribal interests should look like.   
The Court’s inordinate reliance on Federal common law for these purposes shows that 
the Court does not believe that Congress can be counted on to protect the interests of non-
members or states in Indian Country.246  In a non-Federal Indian law context, scholars have noted 
that the Court’s new vigor to protect norms of Federalism is based on a belief that Congress does 
not always have the states’ interest foremost in mind when enacting legislation.247  Although 
there is no data supporting the ineptness of Congress to look after the interests of states and 
non-members in Indian Country, there is legislative gridlock generally speaking.248  It would 
therefore not be surprising for the Court to think that this gridlock may extend to controversial 
issues in Indian Country.  
This perceived inability or unwillingness of Congress to protect the interests of states and 
non-members has pushed the Court to reverse certain common law presumptions that used to 
govern the field of Indian Affairs.  Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, the Court during the 
Rehnquist years adopted a “dependency” paradigm for the incorporation of tribes into our 
federalist system. 249  Under that paradigm, tribes were not being incorporated under a third 
sphere of sovereignty but were “dependent” on Congress for all their political rights.  In other 
words, the Court’s jurisprudence was evolving towards a position that would require the 
existence of tribal power to be somehow confirmed in treaties or legislation.250  In addition, the 
Court was moving towards a position requiring Congressional intent to preempt state jurisdiction 
in Indian country to be clearly indicated. 251   Thus, instead of looking for Congress to act 
affirmatively to protect states and non-member interests, the Court was putting the burden on 
                                                          
246 As Stated by the late Philip Frickey:“it seems plain that the trend has been motivated by a judicial sense 
that Congress has failed to step in and fix a myriad of festering local problems by eliminating tribal 
authority.” Native American Exceptionalism, supra at note 17, at pp. 460-461. 
247 See Ruth Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 80 (2001); Daniel Farber, 
Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133 
(2000).   
248 See note 244, supra. 
249 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within “Our Federalism”: Beyond the 
Dependency Paradigm, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 667 (2006).  
250 Id., at 668 
251 Id. 
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Congress to confirm tribal power and clearly establish its intent to pre-empt state jurisdiction in 
Indian Country.252    
Although Congress has adopted broad policies favoring tribal self-government, the Court’s 
effort to impose its own agenda through federal common law has been facilitated by the fact 
that Congress has rarely addressed general conflicts involving tribal and state claims to power on 
Indian reservations.  As I have argued elsewhere, this lack of precise congressional direction on 
state taxation and tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members has enabled the Court through the 
use of formalism to formulate rigid rules from old cases in order to justify its decisions favoring 
States rights and disallowing tribal jurisdiction over non-members. 253   The typical formalist 
analysis uses a “rule” derived from authoritative text.  Functionalism, on the other hand, applies 
“standards” to resolve a given conflict.254  The use of formalism instead of functionalism has 
enabled the Court to hide its policy choices behind such rigid rules. Using a functional approach 
in federal Indian law would at least force the Court to explain why its holdings are congruent with 
current congressional policies.255 
As the previous section demonstrated, the Court feels emboldened to use federal common 
law to divest tribes of jurisdiction over non-members and allow state tax jurisdiction in Indian 
Country because it thinks that the chances of Congress reacting to anti tribal decisions favoring 
States’ rights or the right of powerful non-Indian interests, are extremely small.  While I have no 
qualms with the right of the Court to use federal common law, the more difficult question is 
whether the Court’s formulation of its common law rules is legitimate.  Although there are very 
few limits, if any, on the power of federal courts to devise rules of federal common law,256 the 
fashioning of rules of decision should be, in one way or another, tied either to congressional 
policies, 257  or to values emanating from the Constitution. 258   As the Court noted, statutes 
establish policies that  
                                                          
252 However, I also argued that the Court’s decision in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) might be 
announcing the Court’s willingness to turn away from the Dependency Paradigm and return to what I 
described as Felix Cohen’s Plenary Power-Sovereignty Paradigm. Under that paradigm, tribes were 
incorporated into the United States as sovereigns, having only lost the power to transfer their lands 
without federal approval and the power to sign treaties with foreign nations.  However, Congress retained 
the plenary power to modify the terms of incorporation and divest tribes of their original sovereignty. Id.  
253 See Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy, supra at note 214.   
254 See e.g. William N. Eskridge Jr., Relationship Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of 
Powers Cases, 22 Harv. J. L & Pub. Pol’y 21 (1998).   
255 Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy, supra at note 214, at p. 395.  
256 See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805 (1989) (stating “I take it then that 
there are no fundamental constraints on the fashioning of federal rules of decision.”) 
257 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121, 168-182 
(2006)(Advocating a “consistent-with federal-policy” test for deciding some federal Common law Indian 
cases such as cases divesting tribes of sovereignty and cases enlarging state jurisdiction in Indian Country.)   
258 See for instance Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 124 (1996)(Arguing that courts should be able to make rules of federal common law only if they are 
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become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of 
statutory construction but also in those of decisional law…This appreciation of the 
broader role played by legislation in the development of the law reflects the practices of 
common law courts from the most ancient times.  As Professor Landis has said “much of 
what is ordinarily regarded as ‘common law’ finds its sources in legislative enactment.259 
Commenting on the Court’s use of Federal Common Law, Professor Frickey once stated 
that the “unstated assumption” underlying these federal common law cases was that even 
though Congress has not spoken on the issues being decided, the Court is presuming that it is 
merely following the “wishes of Congress.”260  Professor Frickey concluded, however, that there 
was no evidence supporting such a judicial presumption.261  Other scholars have noted that when 
it comes to federal Indian common law, the decisional law is divorced from current congressional 
policies.262  As stated by Professor Frank Pommersheim “In a sense, the Court has become the 
ultimate organ for formulating Indian policy in contemporary law.  This raises a quintessential 
separation of powers issue, with the Court usurping the constitutional role of Congress to make 
law and formulate policy.”263  
Native Americans have been described at various times as the “forgotten Americans,” or 
the “vanishing Indians.”  There was a time when almost all Indian tribes were economically 
powerless and had very little or no impact on the political and economic life of the United States.   
These times are over: Whether it is because of the success of Indian casino gaming,264 or other 
aspects of tribal economic development, 265  Indian issues are no longer on the backburner.266  
How Indian tribes conduct their politics and handle their business affairs matters to the non-
Indian world.267  Because of this new reality, the Court may be in the process of adjusting the 
legal landscape.268  In looking for an equilibrium between tribal and non-tribal interests, the Court 
                                                          
directly implied from the constitutional structure or if they are necessary to further a basic structure of 
the constitutional scheme.)  
259 Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390-01, 293 (1970) (quoting James Landis, Statutes and 
the Sources of Law.” in Harvard Legal Essays 213-14 (1934). 
260 Frickey Our Age of Colonialism, supra at note 18, at p.7.  
261 Id. 
262  See Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra at note 10.  
263 Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians Tribes, and the Constitution 229 (2009).  
264 See generally, Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 Ariz. St. L. J. 253 
(2010). 
265  On tribal economic development, see Robert J. Miller, American Indian Entrepreneurs: Unique 
Challenges. Unlimited Potential, 40 Ariz. Sr. L. J. 1297 (2008), W Greg Guedel & J.D. Colbert, Capital 
Inequality, and Self Determination: Creating a Sovereign Financial System for Native American Nations. 41 
Am. Ind. L. Rev. 1 (2016).  
266 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Tribal Business & the Off-Reservation Market, 12 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 1047 (2008). 
267 See Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1049 (2007) (explaining why it is 
more important than ever for tribal governments to adopt good governmental practices.)  
268 See Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns, supra at note 21. 
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may be adjusting the rules to ensure what it (subjectively) considers a level playing field between 
the tribes on one hand and the states and non-Indians on the other.  Controversial decisions in 
cases such as City of Sherrill, and Plains Commerce Bank, may reflect a knee jerk reaction to the 
tribes’ newfound political and economic power.  A good example of the Court’s desire to create 
a new level playing field is its recent decision in Lewis v. Clark. 269  In that case, the Court refused 
to extend the tribe’s sovereign immunity to a tribal employee alleged to have committed a tort 
off the reservation but still within the scope of his employment.  In coming to its decision, the 
Court took into account whether similar state employees would have enjoyed the State’s 
sovereign immunity in such situations.270 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s continued reliance on federal common law doctrines to divest tribes of 
sovereignty or allow state jurisdiction in Indian Country, is unfortunate and undermining 
congressional policies favoring tribal self-government and economic self-sufficiency.  However, 
there are reasons for tribes to be optimistic.  Congressional response to the Supreme Court Indian 
law jurisprudence, while not overly active, has not been detrimental to tribal interests.  Although 
enacting pro Indian pan-tribal legislation, such as the Indian Child Welfare Act, is definitely harder 
than it used to be,271 individual tribes have continued to be successful in enacting tribal specific 
legislation.272 Moreover, the overall percentage of tribal wins in the last thirty years while not 
great (28%), has increased with each decade.273   
In conclusion, I concur with Professor Berger that there are reasons for Indian nations to 
be optimistic.274  The overall trend in the cases does indicate that the Court is more willing now 
to support the integration of Indian nations as the third sovereigns within our federalist system. 
The Court, however, may be getting around to accepting the position of tribes as the third 
sovereigns within our federalism.   A recent Supreme Court decision indicates a more positive 
attitude towards tribal sovereignty than the one prevailing during the Rehnquist years. Thus, in 
a non-Indian case discussing the inherent sovereignty of Puerto Rico, the Court declared per 
Justice Kagan 
Originally, this Court has noted “the tribes were self-governing sovereign political 
communities possessing (among other capacities) the “inherent power to prescribe laws 
for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.”  After the formation of the 
United States, the tribes became domestic dependent nations, subject to the plenary 
                                                          
269 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017). 
270 Id., at 1290-91 (After summarizing the rules denying extension of state sovereign immunity in such 
circumstances, the Court stated “There is no reason to depart from these general rules in the context of 
tribal sovereign immunity.”) 
271 On suggesting strategies to enact pan-tribal legislation supporting tribal self-determination, see Kevin 
K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 777 (2006).  
272 See Carlson, Congress and Indians, supra at note 25. 
273 See discussion supra at notes 150-154. 
274 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra at note 14. 
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control of Congress… But unless and until Congress withdraws a tribal power—including 
the power to prosecute—the Indian community retains that authority in its earliest form.  
The ultimate source of a tribe’s power to punish tribal offenders” thus lies in its 
“primeval” or, at any rate, “pre-existing” sovereignty: A tribal prosecution, like a State’s 
is “attributable in no way to any delegation… of federal authority.275   
  
                                                          
275 Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016)(holding that for the purposes of the double 
jeopardy clause, Puerto Rico did not have any inherent sovereignty separate from that of the United 
States.)   Although there were two dissenters, only Justice Thomas objected to the quoted language. 
(Thomas concurring in part at p. 1877). See also Note, Fifth Amendment-Double Jeopardy-Dual 
Sovereignty Doctrine-Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle 130 Harv. L. Rev. 347 (2016).    
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Appendix A 
Cases Citation  Win/Loss Type of Law Used 
Substantive Rights 
Affected 
Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante 
480 U.S. 9 
(1987) Win Federal common law sovereign rights 
Amoco Production v. Gambell 
480 U.S. 531 
(1987) Loss 
Statutory/treaty 
interpretation Economic Right 
Hodel v. Irving 
481 U.S. 704 
(1987) Loss Constitutional law Economic Right 
United States v. Cherokee Nation 
480 U.S. 700 
(1987) Loss Constitutional law Economic Right 
California v. Cabazon Band 
480 U.S. 202 
(1987) Win 
Common 
law/statutory 
Sovereign/economic 
right 
Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Ass. 
485 U.S. 439 
(1988) Loss Constitutional law Cultural/religious 
Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Graham 
489 U.S. 838 
(1989) Loss procedural N/A 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. 
Holyfield  
490 U.S. 30 
(1989) Win 
Statutory/treaty 
interpretation Sovereign/political 
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico 
490 U.S. 163 
(1989) Loss Federal common law sovereign/political 
Duro v. Reina 
495 U.S. 676 
(1990) Loss Federal common law sovereign political 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes 
492 U.S. 408 
(1990) 
win and 
loss Federal common law Sovereign political 
Employment Division v. Smith 
494 U.S. 872 
(1990) Loss Constitutional law Cultural/religious 
Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Citizen 
Band 
498 U.S. 505 
(1991) win Common law sovereign/political 
Blatchford v. Native Village of 
Noatak 
501 U.S. 775 
(1991) loss Constitutional law Sovereign/political 
County of Yakima v. 
Confederated Tribes 
502 U.S. 251 
(1992) Loss 
Statutory/treaty 
interpretation Sovereign/political 
Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Sac & 
Fox 
508 U.S. 114 
(1993) Win Common law Sovereign/political 
South Dakota v. Bourland 
508 U.S. 679 
(1993) Loss Common law Sovereign/political 
Negonsott v. Samuels  
507 U.S. 99 
(1993) Loss 
Statutory/treaty 
interpretation Sovereign/political 
Lincoln v. Vigil 
508 U.S. 182 
(1993) Loss procedural N/A 
Hagen v. Utah 
510 U.S. 399 
(1994) Loss 
Statutory/treaty 
interpretation Sovereign/political 
Dept. of Taxation v. Milhelm 
512 U.S. 679 
(1994) Loss Common law Sovereign/political 
Ok.Tax Comm. V. Chickasaw 
Nation 
515 U.S. 450 
(1995) Win Common law Sovereign/political 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida 
517 U.S. 44 
(1996) Loss Constitutional law Sovereign/political 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors 
520 U.S. 438 
(1997) Loss Common law Sovereign/political 
Babbitt v. Youpee 
519 U.S. 234 
(1997) Loss Constitutional law Economic Right 
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Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene 
521 U.S. 261 
(1997) Loss 
Statutory 
Interpretation Sovereign/Political 
Alaska v. Village of Venetie 
522 U.S. 520 
(1998) Loss 
Statutory 
Interpretation Sovereign/political 
Cass County v. Leech Lake Band 
524 U.S. 103 
(1998) Loss 
Statutory 
Interpretation Sovereign/political 
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux 
Tribe 
522 U.S. 329 
(1998) Loss 
Statutory 
Interpretation Sovereign/political 
Montana v. Crow Tribe 
523 U.S. 696 
(1998) Loss Common law Sovereign/Political 
Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing 
Technologies 
523 U.S. 751 
(1998) Win Common law Sovereign/Political 
Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. 
Blaze 
526 U.S. 32 
(1999) Loss Common Law Sovereign/Political 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa 
526 U.S. 172 
(1999) Win Treaty Interpretation Economic/Property 
El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie 
526 U.S. 473 
(1999) Loss Statutory Sovereign/Political 
Amoco Production v.  Southern 
Ute Tribe 
526 U.S. 865 
(1999) Loss Statutory Economic/Property 
Dept. of Interior v. Klamath River 
Users 
530 U.S. 495 
(2000) Loss Common Law Trust doctrine 
Rice v. Cayetano 
528 U.S. 495 
(2000) Loss Constitutional law Political right 
Arizona v. California 
530 U.S. 392 
(2000) Win Procedural Property right 
Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States 
534 U.S. 84 
(2001) Loss statutory Economic Right 
Nevada v. Hicks 
533 U.S. 353 
(2001) Loss Common law sovereign rights 
C&L Enterprise v. Citizens Band 
Potawatomi 
532 U.S. 422 
(2001) Loss common law sovereign rights 
Atkinson Trading v. Shirley 
532 U.S. 645 
(2001) Loss Common law Sovereign/political 
Idaho v. United States 
533 U.S 262 
(2001) win statutory Property right 
Inyo County v. Paiute Shoshone 
Indians 
538 U.S. 701 
(2003) Loss Statutory Sovereign 
United States v. Navajo Nation I 
537 U.S. 488 
(2003) Loss Common Law Trust doctrine 
United States v. White Mountain 
Apache 
537 U.S. 465 
(2003) win Common Law Trust doctrine 
United States v. Lara 
541 U.S. 193 
(2004) win Constitutional law Sovereign/political 
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation  
544 U.S. 197 
(2005) Loss Common law Sovereign/political 
Wagnon v. Prairie Band 
Potawatomi 
546 U.S. 95 
(2005) Loss Common law Sovereign/political 
Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt 
543 U.S. 631 
(2005) Win Statutory Economic/property 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long 
Family Land 
554 U.S. 316 
(2008) Loss Common law Sovereign/political 
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs 
556 U.S. 163 
(2009) Loss Statutory Property right 
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United States v. Navajo Nation II 
556 U.S. 287 
(2009) Loss Common law Trust doctrine 
Carcieri v. Salazar 
555 U.S. 379 
(2009) Loss Statutory Sovereign 
United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Nation 
564 U.S. 162 
(2011) Loss Common law Trust doctrine 
United States v. Tohono O'Odham 
563 U.S. 307 
(2011) Loss procedural trust doctrine 
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo 
132 S. Ct. 2181 
(2012) Win Statutory Economic Property 
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish v. 
Patchack 
132 S. Ct. 219 
(2012) Loss Statutory Trust doctrine 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 
133 S. Ct. 2552 
(2013) Loss Statutory Sovereign/political 
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community 
124 U.S. 2024 
(2014) Win Common law Sovereign/political 
Nebraska v. Parker 
136 S. Ct. 1072 
(2016) Win Statutory Sovereign/political 
United States v. Bryant 
136 S. Ct. 1954 
(2016) win Common law Sovereign/political 
Menominee v. United States 
136 S. Ct. 750 
(2016) loss procedural Economic/property 
Dollar General v. Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw 
136 S. Ct. 2159 
(2016) win Common law Sovereign/political 
Lewis v. Clark 
137 S. Ct. 1285 
(2017) Loss Common law Soevreign/political 
Matal v. Tam  
137 S. Ct. 1744 
(2017) Loss Constitutional law Cultural/religious 
 
